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Abstract
This paper examines the hypothesis that living close to grandparents is optimal
for Southern European young couples with children in which the wife works given the
combination of, on the one hand, substantial help ows in the form of grandparenting
and, on the other hand, the shortage in the provision of formal childcare services in
these countries. I develop a partial equilibrium job search model that incorporates
these ndings. Simulation results show that a reduction in the price of private
childcare services is more e¤ective in increasing womens employment, fertility and
inter-regional migration rates than an increase in the availability of publicly funded
childcare slots. Using ECHP data I nd that families with children in which the wife
works move signicantly less than equivalent childless couples only if they live in a
Southern European country. That e¤ect is found for both inter- and intra-regional
migrations but is substantially larger in the former case.
JEL Classication: J13, J22, J61.
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1 Introduction
Inter-regional mobility rates are lower in Europe than in the United States. Within
Europe, Southern countries like Greece, Italy and Spain stand out for the low mobility
of their population. Young adults and the highly educated are the most mobile groups
in any country. However, inter-regional mobility rates for these two collectives in Greece
and Spain are lower than those for the old and the less educated, respectively, in France,
Germany and the United Kingdom (OECD, 2005). Although promoting spatial mobility
is not an end in itself, it is an important policy issue in countries, like Southern European
ones, where regional disparities are pronounced (OECD, 2005).
The research on low internal migration has focused on institutional factors such as
the unemployment insurance system or the homeownership structure. These factors are
thought to make workers more geographically attached, thus reducing internal migration.
The evidence is, however, mixed.
For unemployment benets, the attachment arises due to the disincentive search e¤ort
e¤ect. Unemployment benets raise the value of being unemployed, thus increasing reser-
vation wages and lowering search e¤ort (Mortensen, 1977). Hassler et al. (2003) argue
that the di¤erence in the generosity of unemployment benets can explain the di¤erence
in mobility rates between the United States and Europe, where Europe is characterized
by more generous benets and lower mobility. Antolin and Bover (1997) nd, using data
for Spain, that unemployed men registered at the public employment o¢ ce are less likely
to move than those not registered. That nding is interpreted as evidence supporting the
hypothesis that benets reduce mobility since being registered is a necessary condition
for receiving benets in Spain.
On the contrary, Barron and Mellow (1979) show that benet recipients reduce search
time but increase the productivity of time spent on job search through the increased ex-
penditure a¤orded by benets. Wadsworth (1991) also nds, using data for the United
Kingdom, that benets can enhance job-matching e¢ ciency by improving job search pro-
ductivity. Tatsiramos (2004) and Goss and Paul (1990) nd, using data for several Euro-
pean countries and for the United States, respectively, that unemployment benets have
no net impact on mobility. Benet recipients reduce search time but have an additional
source of income to nance mobility costs.
Housing tenure is also stressed as a factor determining spatial mobility. Barcelo (2003)
using pooled data for several european countries, Gobillon (2001) for France and Gardner
et al. (2001) for the United Kingdom, among others, have shown that housing tenure
a¤ects unemployed workersincentives to accept a job involving a residential change. They
nd that renters living in social housing and, in particular, owners, are more reluctant
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to move for job-related reasons. At the macroeconomic level, however, no relevant cross-
country correlation is found between di¤erences in the distribution of households across
housing tenure regimes and discrepancies in inter-regional migration rates.1 Ownership
rates in the United Kingdom and the United States are quite close to those for Greece and
Italy. Additionally, the former two countries plus Sweden are at the top of the distribution
when ownership and social renting are jointly considered.
This paper presents a novel hypothesis to explain the low inter-regional mobility that
characterizes Southern European countries by focusing on the factors determining the
mobility of the most mobile group: emancipated young adults. I argue that Southern
European young couples with children in which the wife works take advantage of the low
labour force participation rate of their own mothers to reconcile work and family life and,
thus, are more reluctant to move to another region than their counterparts living in other
developed countries.
Couples with children in which the wife works living far from their relatives lose the
childcare services the latter provide, which dampens mobility when alternative services
of similar cost and quality are unavailable.2 This disincentive migration e¤ect is likely to
be particularly relevant in Southern Europe for two reasons. First, these countries have
the highest stock of potential caretakers within the family network, since they have the
lowest labour force participation rates of women aged over 45 years old within developed
countries. Second, publicly provided childcare is severely rationed in these countries, both
in the number of places available and in the number of hours of care o¤ered, and, due to
strict regulations, private provision is scarce.3
Data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) and
the United States Household and Retirement Study (HRS) are used to show that time
transfers in the form of grandparenting are substantially higher in Southern European than
in other developed countries. The time that Southern European grandmothers devote to
take care of their grandchildren increases when the mother is employed and remains at
high values even after the grandchild is enrolled in formal education.
I develop a partial equilibrium job search model in which couples make fertility, fe-
male labour supply and inter-regional migration choices taking as given the availability of
di¤erent childcare arrangements. The model assumes that family caretakers, i.e. grand-
mothers, do not migrate with the couple, thus making couples with children and access
1Cross-country data on the distribution of households across housing tenure regimes is taken from
Trilla (2001).
2In a related framework, Munshi and Rosenzweig (2005) nd that low spatial and marital mobility
in rural India is due to the existence of caste networks that provide mutual insurance to their members.
Households that out-marry or migrate lose the services provided by these networks, which dampens
mobility when alternative sources of insurance or nance of similar quality are unavailable.
3See Del Boca et al. (2004) for a comparison of childcare systems in several developed countries.
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to grandparenting more reluctant to migrate. I use the model to simulate the e¤ects of
several experiments such as an increase in the availability of publicly nanced childcare
slots.
Finally, I use data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) for the
period 1994-2001 to analyze the migration decisions of families living in countries char-
acterized by di¤erent childcare arrangements. Estimates show that families with children
where the wife works move signicantly less than equivalent childless couples only if they
live in a Southern European country. This e¤ect is found for both inter- and intra-regional
moves, but is substantially larger in the former case. The inter-regional deterring e¤ect
of the wife working, having at least one child and living in Southern Europe is larger than
the homeownership e¤ect.
The paper is organized in ve sections. Section 2 links cross-country di¤erences in
internal migration with di¤erences in female labour force participation, time transfers
within the family network and the provision of organized childcare services. Section 3
develops a partial equilibrium job search model that incorporates time transfers within
the family network. Section 4 presents and discusses the microeconomic evidence and,
nally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Macroeconomic evidence
This section describes the available evidence on cross-country di¤erences in internal mi-
gration and documents that developed countries with the lowest inter-regional migration
rates are those with the highest levels of the following variables: percentage of emanci-
pated women living close to their mothers; help ows from the mother to her emanci-
pated daughters in the form of grandparenting; intergenerational gap in female labour
force participation, and degree of rationing in the provision of public childcare services.
Furthermore, intra-regional migration rates in these countries are close to those for other
developed countries and a low proportion of women remain childless at the end of their
fertile period.
2.1 Cross-country di¤erences in internal migration
There is signicant variation in internal migration within developed countries. Table 1
shows that inter-regional gross migration ows are lower in Europe than in the United
States. In Europe, however, the situation is not uniform across countries. While the
United Kingdom stands out for its high inter-regional migration ows, Southern European
countries do so for the reduced proportion of their populations that change region of
residence over the year.
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Young adults and the highly educated are the most mobile groups in any country
(columns 2 and 6). Inter-regional migration ows for the young and the highly educated
in Greece and Spain are lower than those for the old and the less educated, respectively,
in France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. On the contrary, intra-
regional migration rates in Southern Europe are close to those for other large European
countries (column 3). That is, low mobility is not a distinctive feature of Southern Euro-
pean countries when mobility is dened over shorter distances.
2.2 Internal migration and intra-family time transfers
Finding cross-country comparable data on time transfers within family members is not an
easy task. Recently, the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE)
has provided us with such data for several European countries. SHARE is a longitudinal,
multidisciplinary and cross-national survey representing the population of individuals aged
over 50 years in Europe.
The rst wave of SHARE took place in 2004 with ten participating countries: Austria,
Germany, The Netherlands, France, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, Greece, Italy and
Spain. Respondents provided detailed information on their, their partners and their
childrens sociodemographic characteristics and labour status. They were also asked about
the residential location of their children, the frequency of contacts with them and the
time and monetary transfers they give to and receive from them. I also use the Health
and Retirement Study (HRS) to obtain comparable indicators for the United States.4
Respondents aged over 70 years are excluded since they have increasing health di¢ culties
and net time transfers may ow in the opposite direction, that is, from the emancipated
children to their parents.
According to Table 2, emancipated women live closer to their mothers in Southern
Europe than in other developed countries. Less than 20 percent of emancipated women
aged 20 to 35 years live more than 25 kilometers away from their mothers in Southern
Europe. That number is more than 20 percentage points lower than those for France,
Sweden and the United States, and more than 10 percentage points lower than that for
Germany.
Over half of all grandmothers in any European country report that they devote some
time every week to take care of their grandchildren (column 2). That proportion is re-
duced to approximately one third in the United States. The singularity of Southern
4The English Longitudinal Study on Ageing is the equivalent survey for the United Kingdom. That
database is not included in the analysis since it does not include information about the residential location
of emancipated children and grandparenting time cannot be properly isolated from help ows to other
family members, neighbours or friends.
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Europe emerges when looking at the proportion of grandmothers taking care of their
grandchildren on a daily basis. Approximately one out of two Greek and Spanish grand-
mothers that take care of their grandchildren do so almost every day. In Italy, it is almost
two out of three grandmothers. The corresponding percentages for French and German
grandmothers are, approximately, 30 percentage points lower than those for Spain and
Greece. That di¤erence amounts to around 45 percentage points when Southern European
grandmothers are compared to their Swedish counterparts.
Cross-country di¤erences in the frequency of grandparenting translate into di¤erences
in the average number of weekly hours of grandparenting. At the top of the distribution,
Greek grandmothers devote, on average, 36 hours a week to take care of their grandchil-
dren. Close to the Greek record are Spanish and Italian grandmothers with approximately
25 hours per week, on average. Grandmothers from other countries are quite far from
these numbers, particularly so those from Sweden and the United States.
The last two columns in this table show that emancipated women living closer to their
mothers in France and Germany receive, on average, six hours more of grandparenting
time per week than those living further. That di¤erence amounts to, at least, 15 hours
per week in Southern Europe. On the contrary, mothers in Sweden and the United States
receive a fairly low amount of grandparenting time no matter their residential location.
Table 3 further analyzes grandparenting time by focusing on women living closeto
their mothers, that is, those living less than 25 kilometers away from them. Grandpar-
enting time is higher if the mother is employed, particularly so in Greece, where working
mothers receive an average number of weekly hours of grandparenting equal to the 40-
hour standard working week in that country. On the contrary, grandparenting time in
Sweden and the United States is low regardless of the employment status of the mother.
Finally, grandparenting time remains at high values in Southern Europe even when the
youngest grandchild is enrolled in formal education and aged over 6 years. The relevance
of non-parental care for children enrolled in formal education is likely to be higher in
countries, like Southern European ones, with a longer standard number of working hours
and a lower proportion of part-time contracts.5
This empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that, whithin developed countries,
time transfers in the form of grandparenting are highest in countries with the lowest
inter-regional migration rates. The opportunity cost of living far from their mothers is
higher for Southern European working mothers than for their counterparts living in other
developed countries.6
5See OECD (2002) for a comparison of the labour market performance of women in OECD countries.
6The opportunity cost of living far from their mothers would be zero if they receive monetary trans-
fers that compensate them for the grandparenting time they do not receive when living far from their
mothers. Own calculations using SHARE data show that only four percent of families living far from the
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Before moving to the next piece of evidence there is one question to answer: Why
do grandmothers take care of their grandchildren? Altruism might be an explanation,
but that behaviour can also be explained if generations are selsh. Rangel (2003) ex-
plains intergenerational transfers in the latter case by distinguishing between forward and
backward intergenerational goods (FIGs and BIGs, respectively). The former category
includes transfers from present to future generations, like parental investment in educa-
tion or, in this context, help ows from the grandmother to her children. On the contrary,
BIGs are transfers from the future to the present generation such as pay-as-you-go social
security or taking care of elderly parents.
Rangel (2003) shows that BIGs generating a positive surplus are self-sustainable on
their own, but FIGs never are. However, even with selsh generations, optimal investment
in future generations can take place if the equilibrium social norm links BIGs and FIGs.
In this context, help ows from the grandmother to their children are self-sustainable
if generations are selsh and the family norm states that taking care of grandchildren
is a prerequisite for the grandmother to be cared by their children when older.7 ;8 The
migration deterring impact of living in a Southern European country for couples with
children would be higher than expected if help ows in the form of grandparenting are
just the rst part of an intergenerational contract stating that the couple have to take
care of the grandmother when older.
2.3 Internal migration and female labour force participation
Table 4 presents labour force participation rates by sex and age groups for several large
developed countries. While male participation rates are quite similar across countries,
female participation rates are far more disperse. Furthermore, while the participation
rate of Southern European women aged 25 to 34 years is close to the OECD average for
that collective, that for women aged over 45 years is, on average, 40 percent lower than
the corresponding average. That is, Southern European countries stand out for showing
maternal grandmother receive monetary transfers from her. Moreover, the cross-country dispersion in
that percentage is low. I consider monetary transfers di¤erent from those intented to help daughters to
buy a house, those related to a major family event (marriage, divorce, birth), to help with unemployment,
for further education or to meet a legal obligation.
7This is an example of a self-enforcing family constitution (Cigno, 1993). The family constitution
prescribes the transfers that each generation should make and it is self-enforcing because it is in each
generationss self-interest to comply with its prescribed actions. That is, it supports a sub-game-perfect
Nash equilibrium.
8Iacovou (2000) shows, using ECHP data, that the percentage of Southern European women aged
80 and over who live with their children ranges from 30 percent in Italy to 45 percent in Spain. The
corresponding percentages for France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Denmark are 16, 12, 10 and 3
percent. That is, help ows are also more relevant in Southern Europe when they move in the opposite
direction.
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the most pronounced intergenerational di¤erences in female participation rates. In fact,
that di¤erential is not relevant in any country but in Southern European ones.
The same picture emerges when analyzing employment rates in Table 5. Female
employment rates are lower in Southern Europe, particularly so for those aged over 45
years, and the cross-national dispersion in males employment rates is much lower than
that for women.
These ndings can be explained by considering the relevant intergenerational di¤er-
ences in female educational attainment found in Southern European countries. As shown
in Table 6, less than 10 per cent of Southern European women aged 55 to 64 years have
attained tertiary education. The corresponding percentages for other developed countries
ranges from approximately 15 per cent in France or Germany to more than 30 per cent
in North American countries.
Female enrollment in tertiary education began late in Southern Europe but it has
grown rapidly. Spain in a paradigmatic case. While the percentage of Spanish women
aged 25 to 34 years who have attained tertairy education is slightly higher than that for
the United States, that for Spanish women aged 45 to 54 years is less than half of the
corresponding percentage for the United States.
This empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that Southern European countries
are those with the highest stock of potential caretakers within the family network, i.e.,
women aged over 45 years not participating in the labour market. Furthermore, it also
shows that the proportion of working women with non-participating mothers is higher in
Southern European than in other developed countries.
The correlation between cross-country di¤erences in inter-regional migration rates and
in the participation rate of women aged over 45 years old is approximately 0.75. This
correlation is substantially higher than those obtained when di¤erences in inter-regional
migration rates are correlated with those in the participation rate of other sex and age
groups in Table 4. The same holds when considering cross-country discrepancies in em-
ployment rates.
2.4 Internal migration and the market provision of childcare
services
Greater access to help ows within the family network only dampens mobility when al-
ternative services of similar cost and quality are scarce or unavailable. As previously
discussed, publicly provided care for young children in Southern Europe is severely ra-
tioned both in the number of places available and in the number of hours of care o¤ered
and, due to strict regulations, private provision is scarce.
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As shown in Table 7, Southern European countries are those with the lowest number of
publicly provided childcare slots for children under three years per hundred children and,
at the same time, those with the lowest proportion of preschool children using formal
(public or private) childcare services. childcare arrangements vary considerably across
countries. While these services are mainly publicly provided in most Central and Northern
European countries, private caretaking is the most frequent childcare arrangement outside
the family network in the United Kingdom and the United States.
The cross-country correlation between inter-regional migration rates and the propor-
tion of preschool children using formal childcare arrangements is 0.74.
2.5 Internal migration and the presence of children
This paper attemps to explain the low mobility that characterizes Southern Europe rela-
tive to other developed areas by focusing on cross-country di¤erences in childcare arrange-
ments. The aggregate relevance of this hypothesis, thus, rests on there being a signi-
cant proportion of young couples with children in these countries. Kohler et al. (2006)
document that Italy and Spain were the two rst countries to attain and sustain below-
replacement fertility levels in the early 1990s. Greece reached that condition in the late
1990s. As shown in Table 8, the low fertility that now characterizes Southern Europe
has not translated into a high level of childlessness relative to other developed areas.9 In
fact, the proportion of Southern European women who remain childless when aged 40 to
45 years is well below that for other developed countries with a higher total fertility rate
like Finland, Sweden and the United States. Thus, Southern European women are more
likely to have children, but they have less children.
2.6 Summary
This section documents that Southern European countries, which have the lowest inter-
regional migration rates, are also countries:
 where intra-regional migration rates are close to those for other developed countries.
 with the highest intergenerational di¤erences in female labour force participation
and employment rates.
 where time transfers in the form of grandparenting are the highest.
 with the highest percentage of emancipated women living close to their mothers.
9See Bettio and Villa (1998) for an analysis of the relationship between female labour force participa-
tion and fertility in Southern European countries.
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 with the lowest provision of public childcare services.
 where a low proportion of women remain childless at the end of the fertile period.
In the next section I develop a theoretical model that addresses these ndings.
3 The model
The goal of the model is to analyze the impact that di¤erent types of childcare arrange-
ments have on the migration behaviour of families with children. The model is based on
that in Barcelo (2003). However, here the unit of analysis is not the individual but the
couple, and childcare provided by close relatives replaces ownership as the factor deterring
mobility. The model is solved by numerical methods since it cannot be solved in closed
form. For simplicity, I present a two-period model.
3.1 Model setup
The are two regions in the economy, A and B. The unit of analysis is a childless couple
deciding about: the region of residence, whether to have a child or not, and the wifes
employment status.10 To keep the model simple I assume that husbands are always
employed.11 However, on-the-job search is allowed for.
Let U and E be the probability of getting a job o¤er each period an individual is
unemployed and employed, respectively. An individual can receive at most one o¤er in
each region every period. Employed wives lose their job with probability . The random
layo¤ rate and the job o¤er arrival rates are assumed to be the same in both regions.
Furthermore, arrival rates are also assumed to be the same for both spouses.
Let T denote the standardnumber of hours associated with a job and let wj1;t and
wj2;t represent the husbands and wifes wages if employed in region j = fA;Bg in period
t. These wages are randomly drawn from the distribution function of husbands and
wiveswage o¤ers F1 (w1) and F2 (w2), respectively, assumed to be independent of each
other.12 Wage o¤ers for husbands (wives) are independent and identically distributed
across husbands (wives) and across regions.
I take the division of labour to be exogenous and assume that only women devote
time to childcaring. Apart from maternal time, two additional inputs can be used in
the production of childcare services: time transfers provided by close relatives (unpaid
10Rather than model the matching of men and women, I assume that couples are bornas such.
11Hereinafter I refer to both members of the couple as husbands and wives, respectively. However, the
model includes couples that are either married or living in consensual union.
12The independence of these two c.d.f.s is not essential to obtaining the results reported in the paper
but it simplies the analysis.
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childcare) and childcare services provided outside the family network (paid childcare).13
The latter includes both public and private caretakers.
Following Wrohlich (2006), I assume that rationing only a¤ects public childcare. Ra-
tioning is explicitely modelled by assuming that public childcare is not only characterized
by a subsidized hourly price, denoted by 1, but also by its availability.14 The probability
of getting a slot in the public sector is denoted by . Couples can always nd a private
caretaker such as a nursery, a nanny or a babysitter that would look after their child at
a su¢ ciently high hourly price denote by 2.
The wife cares for the child herself if she remains unemployed. If she becomes employed
the couple consumes the total amount of childcare time provided by relatives and denoted
by I. If unpaid childcare time is lower than the standardnumber of hours for a job, the
couple apply for a public sector slot.15 If they are granted access, they pay the subsidized
hourly price 1 for the remaining mothers working hours, that is, over T   I hours.
Otherwise, they pay the market price of childcare services for those hours.
Unpaid childcare is only available if the couple and their relatives live in the same
region and never exceeds the mothers working hours.16 Additionally, raising a child
requires a monetary cost, denoted by '. The monetary cost and the availabiliy and cost
of formal childcare services are assumed to be the same in both regions.
13Strictly speaking, this classication of child care arrangements is not correct. Child care provided by
public institutions can also be for free, as it is the case in most European countries for low income families
living in communities that have an income-dependent fee scheme to childcare facilities. Furthermore, child
care provided by close relatives requires, at least, a transportation cost. The classication used in the
model, however, stresses the fact that in most cases child care provided by close relatives is expected to
be cheaper than that provided by formal caretakers.
14Del Boca and Vuri (2006) analyze the female employment consequences of rationing both in the
access to formal child care and in the number of hours of care o¤ered. I abstract from the latter source
of rationing since its inclusion would just reinforce the results of the model. That is, I assume that
whenever a couple is granted access to public child care they can buy the number of hours that they need
to accomodate the wifes working hours.
15The hypothesis that working mothers prefer to rely on the assistance of relatives is supported by
a number of empirical studies. Joesch and Hiedemann (2002) analyze the factors that inuence the
demand for nonrelative child care among families with pre-school children in the United States. They
nd a negative and signicant e¤ect of having a relative other than those living in the household available
to care for the child on both the probability of using formal care and the number of hours of care consumed.
Furthermore, the marginal e¤ect of having a close relative on both decisions is higher than those for the
price of formal child care and the mothers wage rate. Evidence in Chevalier and Viitanen (2003) for
the United Kingdom is also compatible with that assumption. They test whether formal and informal
child care arrangements are substitutes of each other by analyzig whether mothers using informal care
are those that have been rejected from formal child care. They nd that the bulk of mothers queuing
for formal child care is represented by mothers using parental care. Coherent with that nding is the
hypothesis that mothers with access to informal child care arrangements such as grandparenting do not
queue for formal child care.
16Leisure is not included as an argument of the individuals utility function and, thus, I do not consider
situations where grandparenting time exceeds the mothers working hours. Those considerations would be
relevant to explain the relatively high grandparenting time enjoyed by non-employed Southern European
mothers (Table 3).
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Access to public childcare is assumed to follow a deterministic income-dependent
scheme that can be written as follows:
 =

1 if wj1;t + w
j
2;t 6 w
0 if wj1;t + w
j
2;t > w
This elegibility criterion states that two-earner couples whose total income is above
w are not elegible for public childcare. This way of modeling rationing in the provision
of public childcare is equivalent to assuming a limited number of publicly nanced slots
available but has some interpretation advantages in the context of a migration model.17
Couples are assumed to have joint consumption and joint utility. They derive utility
from having a child and from consumption. The instantaneous utility function has a
CRRA form. Childless couplesutility per period is as follows:
u (ct = childless) =
ct

The corresponding instantaneous utility function for couples with a child has the same
form but includes the additional term u0 that captures the assumption that, for a given
level of consumption, couples derive higher utility if the have a child:
u (ct = child) = u0
ct

where u0 > 1 and  > 0.
In the initial period all couples and their families are assumed to live in region A and
not to move. A couple has to live in the region where they work in order to achieve a
positive level of utility. At the beginning of this period the husband is employed, the wife
is unemployed and they have no children. The wife can just receive one job o¤er in region
A with probability U and they have to decide on her employment status (E or U) and
whether they have a child or remain childless (CH or NCH). The decision set in t = 0
is:
D0 =
 
ch; E1; E2; w
A
1;0; w
A
2;0

;
 
ch; E1; U2; w
A
1;0; b
	
where ch = fCH; NCHg and b refers to non-wage income such as unemployment benets.
The couple will choose the option belonging to the set D0 which maximizes its expected
17Del Boca et al. (2004) model access to public child care in this way in their analysis of the child
care choices made by Italian households. They show that access to public child care in Italy depends on
parents income and working status, among other factors.
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intertemporal utility. The decision problem is described by the following Bellman equa-
tion:
V0 = maxfd0;c0g
u (d0; c0) + E [V1 (s1; d

1) =s0; d0]
s.t. c0 +

hA0 (1 + (1  )2) (T   I) + '

n0 = y0
I 6 T;  = f0; 1g ; d0 2 D0; s0 = (NCH;E1; U2)
where n0 and h
j
t are two indicator functions that equal one if the couple has a child, and
if they live in region j in period t and the wife works, respectively, and y0 is the couples
total income. Couples take into account that the optimal decision at t = 0 will a¤ect their
utility at t = 1 and discount it by the factor .
The budget constraint states that if the couple has a child and the wife remains
unemployed (dA0 = 0), she cares for the child herself and the total cost of raising the
child is simply equal to the monetary cost '. If she becomes employed, rearing costs
include both the monetary cost and the cost of childcare services. In that case, the couple
consume available unpaid childcare time and, if it is not enough to cover the mothers
working time, they pay the price of public childcare over T   I hours or the market price
if they are not granted access to public childcare.
At the end of the initial period, employed wives lose their jobs with probability . In
the following period both spouses may receive o¤ers from regions A and B. The decision
set of two-earner couples with children status ch at the beginning of period t = 1 is:
D1 (ch; E1; E2) =
  
ch; E1; E2; w
A
1;t; w
A
2;t

;
 
ch; E1; U2; w
A
1;t; b

;
(ch; E1; E2; w
B
1;1; w
B
2;1);
 
ch; E1; U2; w
B
1;1; b
 
where t = f0; 1g. These couples can continue living in region A or move to region B.
In the former case, they can continue working at the same jobs or quit and accept other
better-paid jobs.18 The couple takes the decision d1 which maximizes their utility in
period 1.
V1 (s1 = (ch; E1; E2)) = maxfd1;c1g
u (d1; c1)
s.t. c1 +

hA1 (1 + (1  )2) (T   I) + hB1 (1 + (1  )2)T + '

n0 = y1
I 6 T;  = f0; 1g ; d1 2 D1 (ch; E1; E2)
18There is no wage growth in the model.
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The new term in the budget constraint reects the assumption that close relatives
do not migrate with the couple and, thus, unpaid childcare is no longer available if the
couple move to region B. Couples that gained access to public childcare in period t = 0
mantain that position if they continue living in region A, the wife works and they satisfy
the income limit condition.
Equivalently, if the wife is unemployed at the beginning of period t = 1, the decision
set of couples with children status ch is:
D1 (ch; E1; U2) =
  
ch; E1; U2; w
A
1;t; b

;
 
ch; E1; E2; w
A
1;t; w
A
2;1

; 
ch; E1; E2; w
B
1;1; w
B
2;1

;
 
ch; E1; U2; w
B
1;1; b
 
where t = f0; 1g, with the couples optimization problem now being:
V1 (s1 = (ch; E1; U2)) = maxfd1;c1g
u (d1; c1)
s.t. c1 +

hA1 (1 + (1  )2) (T   I) + hB1 (1 + (1  )2)T + '

n0 = y1
I 6 T;  = f0; 1g ; d1 2 D1 (ch; E1; U2)
The structure of the model is summarized in Figure 1. This simple model illustrates
how childcare arrangements a¤ect family inter-regional migration. The model focuses on
couples with preschool children, but it remains useful once the child is enrolled in formal
education as long as non-parental care is still needed.
3.2 Solution of the model
Following Eckstein and Wolpin (1989), we can sequentially solve the Bellman equation
backwards given the nite horizon structure of the model. In period t = 1, childless
couples choose the highest consumption option from their choice set, no matter what the
region where that option comes from. Both regions are identical in all respects for these
couples and, thus, they are indiferent between living in region A or B.
Similarly, couples with a child choose the option providing the highest level of con-
sumption. However, consumption is no longer equal to income but to income net of rearing
costs. Any option involving a job for the wife provides higher utility to these couples if
it comes from region A, since their relatives live in that region and, thus, childcare costs
are lower in that region.
These couples may refuse the highest income option when it comes from region B
due to the presence of a trade-o¤ between the higher income they would earn and the
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higher childcare costs they would face in that region. The increase in childcare costs when
moving to region B is likely to be higher if the couple gained access to public childcare
in the initial period. These couples would have to pay a higher hourly price for formal
childcare services, i.e. that of private services, when moving to region B if the highest
income option comes from that region, involves a job for the wife and exceeds the income
limit for public childcare.
Mobility costs for couples with a child are increasing in the unpaid childcare time
they receive from close relatives in region A, in the price of formal childcare services and
decreasing in the income limit for public childcare. The higher the hourly price of formal
childcare services the higher the cost of replacing unpaid childcare by formal alternatives
in region B. The lower the income limit for public childcare the less likely it is that
couples that gained access to public childcare move to region B in the following period.
Mincer (1978) refers to individuals that behave di¤erently with regard to migration
decisions because they are married as tied. Using a standard human capital model, he
shows that there can exist a tied stayeror a tied moverin a particular family move.
We dene tied couplesas those couples in which both spouses are forced to live in a
region they would both emigrate from if they had not had a child.19 The greater the
availability of unpaid childcare provided by immobile relatives, i.e. grandmothers, the
higher the hourly price of formal childcare services and the lower the income threshold for
public childcare, the higher the proportion of tied couplesin the economy. Furthermore,
the higher the mothersemployment rate for given values of those parameters, the more
relevant is the tied couplesphenomenon.
Finally, the reservation wages that make wives unemployed at the beginning of period
t = 1 indi¤erent between accepting a job or not do not depend on o¤er arrival rates, since
couples are in the last period of their life, but depend on their children status. A childless
wive would accept a job if she were paid more than her non-labour income, b, regardless
of the region that the o¤er is coming from. The same holds for the wifes e¤ective wage,
that is, her wage net of childcare costs, if the couple has a child. The mothers reservation
wage will be lower the lower is the hourly cost of formal childcare services and the higher
is the number of publicly provided slots available. Likewise, the higher the availability of
unpaid childcare, the lower the mothers reservation wage for accepting a job in region A.
Moving backwards, I analyze the couples decision rule in the initial period. At the
beginning of this period a couple comprises an employed husband and an unemployed
wife with no children deciding on the wifes employment status and whether to have a
19Mont (1989) develops a joint search model to analyze the two-earner childless family decision to
migrate. He shows that both the husband and the wife can be tied stayers at the same time in the
absence of children.
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child or not.
The reservation wages that make them indi¤erent between the wife working or not
depend on their children status and on the arrival rates. If, for a given chidren status,
employed workers can change jobs more easily than the unemployed nd a job (1 > 0),
wives will prefer to accept a job in t = 0 despite the fact that they are going to be paid less
than their non-labour income b. Additionally, reservation wages also depend on childcare
costs if the couple has a child. The lower the probability of gaining access to public
childcare, the higher the price of formal childcare services and the lower the availability
of unpaid childcare time, the higher the wifes reservation wage.
When deciding whether to have a child the couple compares the intertemporal utility
they would enjoy, for a given wifes working status, with and without a child in the
household. Having a child permanently increases the couples utility for a given level of
consumption but, at the same time, it reduces consumption via rearing costs. The latter
depends on the monetary cost of raising the child (') and, if the wife works, on the income
limit for public childcare, the hourly price of formal childcare services and the availability
of unpaid childcare provided by close relatives. Higher values of ' increment the cost of
having a child and, thus, the probability that the couple remain childless. The same holds
for higher values of 1 and 2 and lower values of w if the wife works. On the other hand,
the higher is the preference for having a child (u0), the more likely it is that they decide
to have the child. The e¤ect of unpaid childcare time is ambiguous. Greater access to
unpaid childcare increases disposable income and, thus, the chances of having a child if
the wife works in region A but, at the same time, reduces the probability of moving to
region B in response to higher income options.
3.3 Simulation results
In this section I analyze the e¤ect of permanent changes in parameter values. In particular,
I run four experiments where I increase: the number of slots in public childcare centers,
the price of public and private childcare services and the unpaid childcare time provided
by close relatives. The analysis is performed conditioning on couples total income.
The description of the benchmark economy is conned to the Appendix. Two-earner
couples with children are the least mobile group in this economy. Their migration rate is
half of that for the most mobile group: childless couples in which the wife is unemployed.
Furthermore, over half of two-earner couples with children that move to region B do so
in response to a higher consumption option that does not include a job for the wife. The
corresponding percentage for childless two-earner couples is 20 percent. That is, migration
rates for two-earner couples and, in particular, for those with children would be lower if
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migration only occurs when moving to region B is Pareto e¢ cient for both spouses.
In the rst experiment I increase the number of publicly nanced childcare slots by
increasing the income limit for public childcare. This lowers both the mothers reservation
wage and the expected cost of childcare services and, thus, increases the wivesemploy-
ment rate and the fertility rate in the rst period. The e¤ect on the overall migration
rate is, a priori, ambiguous. On the one hand, there is an increase in the size of the least
mobile group but, on the other hand, that group becomes more mobile. The increase in
the income limit for public childcare lowers mobility costs for couples that gained access
to a public institution in the initial period and, thus, increases their propensity to move
to region B.
Regarding the second experiment, an increase in the price of private childcare services
increases both the mothers reservation wage and the expected cost of childcare services
in the initial period, thus, reducing womens employment and the fertility rates. The
expected e¤ect on the overall migration rate is also ambiguous since the reduction in the
size of the least mobile group comes with a reduction in the mobility of that group. The
increase in 2 increases the expected cost of replacing unpaid childcare time by costly
alternatives in region B, thus reducing the propensity to migrate of two-earner couples
with children, particularly so for those that gained access to public childcare.
The same holds for couples with children where the wife is unemployed at the beggining
of period t = 1. The higher the price of private childcare services the lower the net income
for options coming from region B and including a job for the wife. Furthermore, the higher
2 the more likely it is that they continue living in region A if they receive one o¤er from
each region including a job for the wife.
The expected consequences in the rst period of an increase in the price of public
childcare services are those for an increase in the price of private services. In the second
period, the increase in 1 lowers the expected cost of moving to region B in response
to a higher income option exceeding the income limit for public childcare for families
that gained access to public childcare in the rst period. Conversely, the increase in 1
does not a¤ect the propensity to migrate of two-earner couples with children whose total
income in the rst period was higher than the income limit for public childcare. That
is, the expected e¤ect on the overall migration rate is positive since the increase in 1
reduces the size of the least mobile group and increases its mobility.
Finally, I analyze the e¤ects of an increase in the unpaid childcare time that couples
receive from close relatives in region A. An increase in I lowers both the mothers reser-
vation wage and the expected cost of childcare services in the initial period and, thus,
increases the fertility rate and the female employment rate. The e¤ect on the migration
rate is clearly negative since the least mobile group increases its size and reduces its mo-
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bility. Mobility costs for couples with children increase, particularly so for two-earner
couples and, in particular, for those that gained access to public childcare.
Simulation results in Figures 2 to 5 indicate that the largest elasticities of the over-
all migration, female employment and fertility rates in response to changes in parameter
values are obtained for changes in available unpaid childcare time and the price of pri-
vate childcare services. On average, a one percent increase in available unpaid childcare
time reduces the overall migration rate by 0.18 percent and increases the overall female
employment and fertility rates by 0.15 and 0.26 percent, respectively. Equivalently, the
elasticities of migration, female employment and fertility with respect to the price of
private childcare services are 0.01, -0.27 and -0.27, respectively.
These results suggest that Southern European countries will experience an increase in
the internal mobility of their population. The mechanism driving this result is the increase
in womens educational attainment observed in these countries in the last few decades
(Table 5). This process will lower the intergenerational gap in womens employment rates
and, thus, the availability of caretakers within the family network that now characterizes
Southern European countries. The reduction in I will lower mobility costs for couples
with children and the option value of living close to the family for childless couples that
expect to have a child.20 ;21
The bad news is that the reduction in I combined with a severely rationed public
childcare sector and the shortage in the private provision of these services, will make
better educated Southern European women have a lower average number of children.
That is, these countries will further reduce their fertility rates unless some policy initiative
aimed at reconciling motherhood and working life is sucessfully implemented. Simulation
results show that the reduction in the price of private childcare services is more e¤ective
at increasing womens employment rate, the proportion of couples with children and the
overall inter-regional migration rate than the increase in the number of public childcare
slots available.
The dramatic increase in the number of foreign inmigrants living in Southern European
countries since the late 1990s might partially solve this puzzle.22 The model predicts
that foreign inmigration will increases the fertility, the internal mobility and the female
employment rate of the native population since foreign inmigration increases the supply
of unskilled labour and, thus, reduces the relative price of services that are intensive in
20As long as the cost of moving to another region is su¢ ciently high as to make that decision almost
irreversible, living close to the mother has an option value for childless Southern European couples, that
of waiting to have children and enjoying lower child care costs.
21Furthermore, that mechanism will cancel the intergenerational contract suggested in Section 2 to
explain why grandmothers provide help ows to their children.
22In 2005, Spain and Italy received more than half of all net migration ows to the European Union
(Eurostat, 2004).
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unskilled time such as personal services like childcare services.
4 Microeconomic evidence
In this section I analyze the determinants of family migration by pooling data from the
European Community Household Panel (ECHP) for the period 1994-2001. The ECHP
is a representative panel of households and individuals in 12 European countries that
covers a wide range of topics: demographics, employment, income, education, housing,
migration, etc. This dataset is particularly useful for the analysis of spatial mobility since
persons who move are followed to their new location.
The ECHP allows us to distinghish two types of residential moves within a country:
moves within the same locality or area and moves to a di¤erent region. I aim at separately
identifying the e¤ect that the wifes employment status and the presence of children in
the household have on shorter- (intra-regional) and longer-distance (inter-regional) family
migration and to test whether these e¤ects vary according to whether the family lives in
a Southern European country or not.
Inter- and intra-regional migration rates for several European countries are presented
in Table 9.23 Inter-regional mobility rates calculated using the ECHP (columns 1 to 4)
are not perfectly comparable to those taken from the OECD (column 5) since they are
based on di¤erent denitions and refer to di¤erent years in some cases, but they follow the
same pattern. Inter-regional migration rates are lowest in Southern Europe and highest
in the United Kingdom. On the contrary, the cross-country dispersion in intra-regional
mobility rates is substantially lower.
The same picture emerges when looking at couples in which both spouses are aged
25 to 45 years. The sample used in the estimation consists of couples that satisfy that
condition one year before the survey. Furthermore, husbands are employed or looking
for a job and wives can be either employed, unemployed or housewives. The information
for the covariates is obtained from the year preceeding the year of the move, to properly
distinguish the causes from the consequences of a move. The sample is further described
in the Appendix.
4.1 Framework of analysis
Let yit be a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if household i has moved to a
di¤erent region within the same country within the year t, and zero otherwise. Following
23I consider large countries for which the ECHP provides information on inter- and intra-regional family
migration.
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Tatsiramos (2004), we assume that there is an underlying response variable yit that can
be explained by the following regression
yit = Xit + i + "it
where Xit is a vector that includes relevant household characteristics such as housing
tenure, the number of kids, the age, labour market status and level of education of both
spouses, and where i is the unobserved time invariant household e¤ect. The latent
variable yit represents the expected gain from migrating given observed characteristics.
Whenever the expected gain is positive we observe a move (yit = 1). The probability of
that event conditional on covariates can be written as
prob (yit > 0) = prob (Xit + i + "it > 0) = F (Xit + i)
where F is the cumulative distribution function of  "it.
Following Chamberlain (1980), this equation can be estimated using two alternative
methods which di¤er in the assumptions they make about the relationship between the
unobserved household e¤ect and the covariates. The random e¤ects probit estimator
identies  by using a linear regression function with normally distributed errors to model
the dependence between i andXit. Mundlak (1978) presents a version of this model where
i=Xi Normal
 
 +X i; 
2


, where X i is the average of Xit and 2 is the variance of
i in the equation i =  + X i + i. In practice, this model is equivalent to that
in Chamberlain (1980) but including as additional regressors the mean of time-varying
covariates.
Alternatively, a consistent estimate of  can be obtained using the xed e¤ects logit
estimator. This estimator provides consistent estimates of the e¤ect of time-varying re-
gressors no matter what is the form of the dependence between the unobserved household
e¤ect and the regressors. Furthermore, it also deals with the potential endogeneity of
time-varying regressors.24
4.2 Empirical results
Random e¤ects probit and xed e¤ects logit estimates for inter- and intra-regional family
migrations are presented in Table 10. Each model is estimated by pooling the individual
observations for the countries in Table 9 but for Germany.25 The e¤ect of interest is
24It could be the case that individuals with a higher propensity to move in response to better economic
conditions self-select into certain levels of formal education, children status, etc. Fixed e¤ects estimators
deal with the endogeneity of the included time-varying regressors as long as unobserved di¤erences in
individualspropensity to move are time invariant.
25Germany is excluded since two of the variables used in the analysis are not provided for individuals
living there. Estimates were also performed excluding that variable from the analysis and including
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that for the variable indicating that the couple has at least one child, the wife works and
it lives in a Southern European country. That variable measures the di¤erential e¤ect
that living in a Southern European country has on the migration behaviour of families
where the mother works, restricting the e¤ect of the other variables to be constant across
countries.
The specications control for the age of the husband, both spouseslevels of formal ed-
ucation and employment status, their children status and whether they own their dwelling
or they rent it. Additionally, I also control for their migration record with two indicator
variables that equal one if the husband or the wife live in the same region since birth, re-
spectively, and zero otherwise. Spouses who have never changed their region of residence
are likely to deter the familys propensity to move to another region since an individuals
attachment to a location is likely to increase the longer he or she resides there.26
Random e¤ects estimates show that the propensity to move to a di¤erent region de-
creases as the age of the husband increases.27 The e¤ect of tertiary education is positive
and slightly higher for husbands than for wives. Higher education has a positive e¤ect
on the familys propensity to move to a new location, specially to another region. Highly
educated individuals can change jobs more easily and have access to the national labour
market as compared to the low skilled who tend to search more in their local labour
market.28
Homeowners are less likely than renters to move. As discussed in Barcelo (2003),
homeowners pay a lower price than renters for housing services and face a higher mobility
cost since they have to sell their home to move to a new location. Additionally, families
in which at least one spouse has always lived in the same region are less prone to move,
specially to another region. This e¤ect is larger when it is the wife who has never changed
region of residence.
Families in which the husband works are more prone to move, within or outside their
region of residence. The e¤ect of the wifes employment status depends on the presence of
children in the household. First, families in which the wife works have a higher probability
of moving to a new location within the same region if they have at least one child in the
household. That e¤ect is found independently of whether the family lives in a Southern
families living in Germany and results were qualitatively identical to those reported in the paper. The
variables in question are the migration records of both spouses.
26Hassler et al. (2003) use that assumption to develop a dynamic general equilibrium model that
accounts for cross-country di¤erences in geographical mobility.
27The output of the random e¤ects model includes parameter , which is dened as the proportion of
the total variance contributed by the household-level variance component. When  is zero, as is the case
for some estimations, the household-level variance component is unimportant and the panel estimator is
equivalent to the pooled probit estimator.
28Schwartz (1973) nds that within a given age group the deterring e¤ect of distance declines with
education.
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European country or not. Second, the presence of children in the household lowers the
probability of moving to another region for Southern European families in which the wife
works.
The picture changes somewhat when looking at the xed e¤ects estimates.29 These
estimates are likely to be more accurate than the random e¤ects ones, since they deal
with potential endogeneity biases and are consistent no matter what is the form of the
dependence between the regressors and the unobserved household e¤ect.
The rst di¤erence with the random e¤ects estimates is that the employment status
of the husband only a¤ects the familys propensity to move within the same region. The
second di¤erence has to do with the e¤ect of interest. Working wives only lower the
familys probability of moving if the couple has at least one child and it lives in a Southern
European country. As opposed to the random e¤ects estimates, where that e¤ect was
limited to inter-regional moves, this e¤ect is now found for both inter- and intra-regional
moves and it is substantially larger in the former case. Moreover, the inter-regional e¤ect is
also much larger than the random e¤ects one. According to these estimates, the deterring
e¤ect of the wife working, having one or more children and living in a Southern European
country is larger than the homeownership e¤ect.
Families in which the wife has never changed region of residence are more likely to
have the maternal grandmother nearby and, thus, to receive help ows in the form of
grandparenting. Living in a Southern European country should exert a higher deterring
impact on the familys propensity to move if the mother works and she has never changed
region of residence, since its mobility costs are likely to be higher in this case. Estimates in
Table 11 conrm this hypothesis. Fixed e¤ects estimates show that the negative migration
e¤ect of the wifes employment status is only signicant when looking at families with
children where the wife has never changed region of residence and living in a Southern
European country. Furthermore, that e¤ect is larger for inter- than for intra-regional
moves and the inter-regional e¤ect is also larger than the one estimated in Table 10
without restricting to the wife living in the same region since birth.
Finally, a further check is performed by estimating xed e¤ects models where the
employment status of the husband replaces that of the wife in the interaction terms that
identify the e¤ect of interest. Given that most of the time parents devote to care for their
children is provided by the mother, living in Southern Europe is expected to deter family
migration to a lower extent when the father, rather than the mother, works. Estimates in
Table 12 conrm this hypothesis. Southern European families in which the father works
29The xed e¤ects logit estimator identies the e¤ect of time-varying regressors by restricting to ob-
servations for which the dependent variable changes during the sample period. This explains that the
number of observations used in a xed e¤ects model is lower than that in the equivalent random e¤ects
estimation.
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do not di¤er in their inter-regional migration behaviour from observationally equivalent
families living in other European countries. On the contrary, these Southern European
families are less prone than their European counterparts to move to a new location within
their region of residence, with that e¤ect being close to that estimated when considering
the wifes employment status.
Fixed e¤ects logit estimates are used to construct predicted probabilities. In the ref-
erence family both spouses are employed, they have no children and live in a rented house
in 1999. Their probability of moving to another region is 4.47 percent. The probability
for families with the same characteristics as the reference family but living in a house of
their own is 1.40 percent. Alternatively, the reference probability reduces to 0.47 percent
if the couple have at least one child, the wife works and they live in a Southern European
country. That is, the reduction in the reference probability is of approximately 90 percent
in the latter case.
These ndings conrm the predictions of the theoretical model: a familys propensity
to move will be lowest if the wife works, they have at least one child, they live in a country
characterized by a poor provision of formal childcare services, they have access to childcare
services provided by inmobile relatives and mobility is dened over long distances.
5 Conclusions
This paper presents a novel hypothesis to explain the low inter-regional mobility that
characterizes Southern European countries by focusing on the factors determining the
mobility of the most mobile collective: emancipated young adults. I argue that Southern
European mothers take advantage of the low labour force participation rate of their own
mothers to reconcile work and family life and, thus, are less prone to move to another
region than their counterparts living in other developed countries.
Working mothers living far from their own mothers lose the childcare services the latter
provide, which dampens mobility when alternative services of similar cost and quality
are unavailable. This disincentive migration e¤ect is likely to be particularly relevant in
Southern European countries for two reasons. First, these countries have the highest stock
of potential caretakers within the family network since they have the lowest labour force
participation and employment rates of women aged over 45 years old within developed
countries. Second, publicly provided childcare is severely rationed in these countries both
in the number of places available and in the number of hours of care o¤ered and, due to
strict regulations, private provision is scarce.
At the macroeconomic level, I document that developed countries with the lowest
inter-regional migration rates are those with the highest levels of the following variables:
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percentage of emancipated women living close to their mothers, intergenerational gap in
female labour force participation and employment rates, degree of rationing in the public
provision of childcare services, and time transfers from the mother to her emancipated
daughters in the form of grandparenting. Moreover, a lower proportion of women remain
childless at the end of their fertile period in these countries.
I develop a partial equilibrium job search model that addresses these ndings and I
use the model to simulate the e¤ects of several experiments. Simulation results show that
a reduction in the price of private childcare services is more e¤ective in increasing wives
employment chances, the proportion of couples with children in the economy and the inter-
regional mobility of the population than an increase in the availability of publicly nanced
childcare slots. Thus, the dramatic increase in the number of foreign inmigrants living
in Southern European countries in the last few years might partially solve this puzzle,
since foreign inmigration increases the supply of unskilled labour and, thus, reduces the
relative price of services that are intensive in unskilled time such as personal services like
childcare services.
At the microeconomic level, I use data from the European Community Household
Panel for the years 1994-2001 to analyze the factors that inuence European families
propensity to move. Estimates show that families with children in which the wife works
move signicantly less than equivalent childless couples only if they live in a Southern
European country. That e¤ect is found for both inter and intra-regional migrations but is
substantially larger in the former case. Families are less likely to change region of residence
if the wife works, they have one or more children and live in a Southern European country
than if they live in a house of their own.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Simulation of the model
I have drawn a sample of 250.000 random couples. The o¤er arrival rates and the random
layo¤ rate are calibrated by pooling data for the 12 countries in the ECHP and for the
eight waves available. The hourly price of public childcare services is such that working
mothers always prefer to use these services if they are granted access to them, that is,
wj2;t > 1, for j = fA;Bg and t = f0; 1g. The hourly price of private childcare services is
calibrated using data from the Spanish Household Budget Survey (Encuesta Continua de
Presupuestos Familiares) (INE, 2005) for the years 2002-2003.
The income limit for public childcare (w) is such that the proportion of couples that
gain access to public childcare coincides with the average of the number of publicly -
nanced childcare slots for children under three years per hundred children, for the countries
in Table 7. The value of I is set at the average of the number of hours of grandparenting
time received by couples living less than 25 kilometers away from the maternal grand-
mother for the countries in Table 2.
In order to condition on the wage earned by each spouse, I discretize the distribution
of wages using ten intervals. Wage o¤ers are drawn from a lognormal distribution function
with mean 1.5 and standard deviation 0.5. The value of ' is calibrated using data from the
Spanish Institute of Family Policy (Instituto de Política Familiar) on the cost of raising
a child for children under three years once childcare costs are excluded from the analysis.
Parameter u0 is set to guarantee that a signicant proportion of couples have a child,
given the values of the other parameters. Finally, if the wife accepts a job o¤er she must
supply 40 hours per week at work. The remaining parameters are taken from Barcelo
(2003). The value of each alternative in t = 0 includes an expected term reecting the
fact that the choice they make in that period will a¤ect their utility in the following
period. I evaluate this term using 15.000 random observations for each group of wage
o¤ers
 
wj1;t; w
j
2;t

.
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Table A1: Parameter values of the benchmark economy
Parameter Value
u0 1.13
 0.98
 0.5
0 0.35
1 0.45
 0.05
w 5220
0 0.35
1 0.7
' 675
T 2080
b 0.33w
w 1.5
lnw 0.47
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6.2 Database description
Table A2: Descriptive statistics of the sample used in the estimation
Finland France UK Greece Italy Portugal Spain
Employment status
Husband
Employed 93.64 94.99 94.85 94.24 93.75 97.22 90.09
Wife
Employed 67.57 61.56 66.11 40.12 44.18 64.73 37.23
Unemployed 8.56 8.92 1.30 9.79 6.03 6.65 11.37
Childless 27.78 24.87 35.93 24.19 29.84 28.14 31.52
Live same region
since birth
Male 30.31 59.47 77.79 62.43 80.51 86.04 70.84
Female 25.53 61.18 76.67 64.17 77.17 87.74 73.29
Husbands educational level
Tertiary 39.98 23.02 54.98 29.05 10.39 8.28 28.12
Upper secondary 45.31 39.56 12.29 38.45 42.07 14.62 20.58
Wifes educational level
Tertiary 51.18 27.20 43.66 27.35 8.93 10.69 25.80
Upper secondary 37.52 34.55 14.65 36.75 44.85 13.08 20.65
Homeowners 76.97 58.29 83.55 70.39 71.44 71.67 83.24
Husbands age 36.27 36.09 35.43 37.43 37.06 36.70 36.32
(5.27) (5.57) (5.37) (5.05) (5.19) (5.33) (5.34)
Notes: I report percentages and mean and standard deviation (in brackets) for discrete and continuous
variables, respectively.
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Figure 1. Structure of the model
where Ej and Uj indicate if the husband (j = 1)/the wife (j = 2) is employed or unem-
ployed, respectively, CH and NCH indicate if the couple have a child or not, respectively,
A and B are the two regions in the economy and  is the layo¤ rate.
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Figure 2. E¤ect of an increase in the number of publicly nanced childcare slots
31
Figure 3. E¤ect of an increase in the price of private childcare services
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Figure 4. E¤ect of an increase in the price of public childcare services
33
Figure 5. E¤ect of an increase in the availability of unpaid childcare time
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Table 1. Gross internal migration ows as a percentage of the population aged 15-64
Inter-regionala
Educational attainment
Age groups Less than
Country Total 15-24 25-64 upper second. Upper second. Tertiary Intra-regionalb
Southern European countries
Greece 0.21 0.56 0.13 0.12 0.25 0.44 2.38
Italy 0.58 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.48
Portugal 0.54 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.33
Spain 0.20 0.23 0.19 0.13 0.23 0.33 3.90
Other European countries
France 2.11 3.79 1.70 1.16 1.98 4.13 4.21
Germany 1.36 2.27 1.18 0.97 1.35 1.97 2.58
Sweden 1.79 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
United Kingdom 2.28 3.80 1.94 1.16 1.93 3.90 4.08
Non-European countries
Australia 2.01 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Canada 0.95 1.55 0.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Japan 2.21 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
United States 3.05 4.09 2.77 2.34 3.00 3.53 n.a.
Notes: a Gross outows as a percentage of the population aged 15 to 64 years, 2003 (2001 for Greece,
Japan and Sweden, 2002 for France and Italy). Source: OECD (2005). b Authors calculations pooling
ECHP data for the years 1994-2001.
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Table 2. Grandparenting time and the residential location of emancipated women
Grandparenting (weekly hours)e
Daughters Grandparenting Daughters living
Country living closea (%) Frequencyc Daily basisd All Close Far
Greece 82.0 56.6 51.8 36.0 36.6 14.9
Italy 82.3 66.5 63.1 25.3 26.2 8.2
Spain 83.7 54.0 55.2 24.4 25.2 9.5
France 57.4 53.7 18.2 14.9 15.3 8.8
Germany 67.4 65.4 22.1 9.4 10.6 4.7
Sweden 57.3 59.5 5.4 5.9 6.3 5.2
United States 44.4b 35.8 n.a. 5.2 6.7 6.6
Notes: a Percent of daughters living less than 25 kilometers away from their mothers. b Percent of
daughters living less than 10 miles (16.1 kilometers) away from their mothers. c Percent of grandparents
that take care of their grandchildren at least one hour a week. d Percent of grandparents that take care
of their grandchildren on a daily basis among those taking care of their grandchildren at least one hour
a week. e Average over respondents taking care of their grandchildren at least one hour a week. Source:
Authors calculations using SHARE and HRS data.
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Table 3. Grandparenting time received by couples living close to the maternal
grandmothera
Age youngest grandchild
Mothers labour status All Employed mothers
Country Employed Non-employed < 3 3 to 6 > 6 < 3 3 to 6 > 6
Greece 40.1 28.8 41.0 32.7 27.1 43.3 40.2 29.2
Italy 29.3 22.6 20.8 26.3 34.1 30.7 30.2 31.5
Spain 28.2 18.3 32.9 27.7 12.4 43.4 30.7 15.1
France 15.9 10.7 16.2 13.5 17.7 16.0 14.4 20.5
Germany 13.1 6.6 10.0 12.9 8.7 14.0 14.9 11.2
Sweden 5.6 5.7 4.3 9.2 6.3 4.4 9.0 5.9
United States 7.5 3.3 6.7 6.7 6.7 7.6 7.5 7.5
Notes: a Living less than 25 kilometers away from the mother in European countries and less than 10
miles away in the United States. Source: Authors calculations using SHARE and HRS data.
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Table 4. Labour force participation rates by sex and age groups
Females Males
25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (3) over (1) (5) (6) (7) (8) (7) over (5)
Southern European countries
Greece 66.1 61.7 45.3 24.5 68.6 95.0 97.0 91.4 59.3 96.3
Italy 60.7 58.9 44.2 15.2 72.8 87.9 96.0 87.4 44.9 99.4
Portugal 81.1 78.7 65.8 38.1 81.1 92.7 95.1 90.8 63.2 97.9
Spain 69.6 59.6 42.3 20.8 60.8 92.4 95.2 90.7 57.5 98.2
Other European countries
Finland 77.6 87.8 87.3 41.5 112.5 90.9 92.7 87.3 45.4 96.0
France 78.0 79.2 75.6 31.6 96.9 94.1 96.4 93.4 42.0 99.2
Germany 74.3 77.1 72.8 32.8 97.9 91.1 96.0 92.7 54.2 101.7
Norway 80.2 84.4 81.6 59.5 101.8 90.8 93.3 91.0 73.8 100.2
Sweden 82.0 88.4 88.5 64.5 107.9 89.2 92.4 91.6 71.8 102.7
United Kingdom 73.2 76.6 75.4 40.8 102.9 93.7 93.1 88.8 63.2 94.7
OCDE 66.2 69.7 66.2 37.4 100.1 93.5 94.7 90.5 63.1 96.8
Std. Dev 6.4 9.7 14.4 14.2 2.1 1.8 2.6 12.3
Non-European countries
Australia 68.3 70.9 68.4 31.3 100.1 92.8 92.2 87.9 60.9 94.7
Canada 77.7 79.0 73.2 38.0 94.2 91.4 92.4 88.8 59.4 97.1
Japan 62.1 65.8 69.8 49.2 112.3 97.0 97.9 97.4 84.9 100.5
United States 75.6 77.3 75.7 50.4 100.2 93.1 92.6 89.0 67.1 95.6
Notes: We report average values for the period 1994-2000. Source: OECD Database on Labour Force
Statistics (online).
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Table 5. Employment rates by sex and age groups
Females Males
25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (3) over (1) (5) (6) (7) (8) (7) over (5)
Southern European countries
Greece 54.0 55.3 41.6 23.6 77.1 86.9 93.4 88.1 57.3 101.5
Italy 49.5 52.9 41.4 14.6 83.6 78.2 91.7 84.3 43.0 107.7
Portugal 74.7 74.4 62.8 37.0 84.1 87.7 91.6 87.1 60.2 99.4
Spain 49.0 46.3 35.0 18.4 71.5 76.6 85.4 82.2 51.3 96.9
Other European countries
Finland 66.9 78.7 79.1 35.3 118.3 80.0 83.5 78.3 38.2 97.9
France 65.5 69.8 68.5 29.0 104.6 83.2 88.8 86.4 38.6 103.8
Germany 68.0 70.2 65.7 27.8 96.6 84.3 89.5 86.1 47.5 102.1
Norway 76.6 82.1 80.2 58.6 104.7 86.4 90.5 88.9 72.1 102.8
Sweden 74.1 82.5 84.4 60.6 113.9 80.4 85.1 85.9 65.8 106.9
United Kingdom 68.6 72.8 72.5 39.3 105.8 86.1 87.2 83.3 58.0 96.7
OCDE 60.4 65.3 63.0 35.7 104.3 87.3 90.2 86.5 59.5 99.1
Std. Dev 8.3 10.4 14.4 13.8 4.2 3.3 3.7 12.1
Non-European countries
Australia 63.6 66.7 65.0 30.0 97.9 85.6 86.7 83.0 56.0 97.0
Canada 71.3 73.2 68.4 35.3 104.2 83.1 85.5 83.0 54.9 99.9
Japan 58.6 63.9 68.2 47.9 86.0 93.3 95.5 95.0 80.2 101.8
United States 71.7 74.2 73.4 48.9 97.6 89.0 89.3 86.2 64.9 96.9
Notes: We report average values for the period 1994-2000. Source: OECD Database on Labour Force
Statistics (online).
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Table 6. Tertiary education attainment by sex and age groups. 2003
Females Males
25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (3) over (1) (5) (6) (7) (8) (7) over (5)
Southern European countries
Greece 27.5 23.9 15.0 7.9 54.6 21.8 25.6 22.8 15.6 104.6
Italy 17.1 12.6 10.6 5.7 62.3 12.1 11.3 11.3 8.7 93.7
Portugal 23.5 15.1 11.0 6.7 46.7 13.7 10.4 8.5 6.7 61.9
Spain 42.4 29.0 17.4 8.4 41.1 34.1 27.7 21.5 16.6 63.1
Other European countries
Finland 46.7 47.1 35.6 23.7 76.3 29.7 32.9 29.4 27.0 99.1
France 41.5 24.7 18.5 13.5 44.5 34.7 22.4 17.3 15.3 50.0
Germany 22.5 23.1 21.4 14.6 95.0 23.3 30.5 31.0 31.1 132.8
Norway 45.8 36.6 30.3 20.2 66.0 32.8 31.7 28.5 26.3 86.8
Sweden 47.1 38.3 36.1 28.8 76.6 37.7 33.2 29.8 25.8 79.0
United Kingdom 34.6 28.8 26.2 21.0 75.8 34.7 30.0 28.4 23.6 81.8
OECD average 37.0 30.0 25.0 18.0 67.6 29.0 27.0 24.0 21.0 82.8
Non-European countries
Australia 40.7 32.4 32.0 22.2 78.6 31.5 29.8 29.6 23.8 93.8
Canada 59.8 50.7 43.4 34.7 72.5 46.8 43.3 39.3 34.3 83.9
Japan 54.0 44.0 29.0 14.0 53.7 49.4 46.5 36.1 24.3 73.2
United States 41.9 41.1 40.8 33.1 97.4 36.2 37.8 40.5 39.6 111.9
Source: OECD Education at a Glance 2006 (online).
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Table 7. Sumary indicators of childcare arrangements in selected OECD countries
Publicly provided slots Proportion of children using
Country per hundred children formal childcare
Southern European countries
Greece 3 3
Italy 6 6
Portugal 12 12
Spain 2 5
Other European countries
Finland 21 n.a.
France 23 29
Germany (Western) 3 10
Germany (Eastern) 36 36
Sweden 33 48
United Kingdom 2 34
Non-European countries
Australia 2 15
Canada 5 45
Japan n.a. 13
United States 1 54
Source: Statistics in columns 1 and 2 are taken from Wrohlich (2005) and from The Family Policy
Database, version 2, Luxembourg Income Study (2003), respectively.
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Table 8. Family size among women aged 40-64 with completed fertility
Distribution by number of children (%)
Country Average None 1 or 2 3 or more Total
Southern European countries
Greece 2.00 7.6 65.2 27.2 100
Italy 1.86 11.0 65.4 23.6 100
Portugal 2.61 8.7 53.0 38.3 100
Spain 2.25 8.4 55.7 35.9 100
Other European countries
Finland 2.14 16.0 48.7 35.3 100
France 2.31 6.8 55.6 37.7 100
Germany 1.85 12.0 64.3 23.7 100
Sweden 2.03 10.1 60.3 29.6 100
United Kingdom 2.33 7.5 57.5 34.9 100
Non-European countries
Canada 2.00 15.6 55.1 29.4 100
United States 1.93 17.9 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Eurobarometer 2002 and Eurobarometer 56.2. Question: Have you had any children? (If yes)
How many? Data for Canada and the United States come from the Family and Fertility Survey and the
U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, June 2002, respectively.
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Table 9. Inter- and intra-regional mobility rates by country
Alla Both spouses aged 25 to 45 yearsa
Inter-regional Intra-regional Inter-regional Intra-regional Groos owsb
Country % % % % %
Southern European countries
Greece 0.47 (170) 2.38 (859) 0.47 (60) 3.80 (484) 0.21
Italy 0.24 (122) 2.48 (1275) 0.42 (81) 3.91 (760) 0.58
Portugal 0.22 (85) 3.33 (1259) 0.35 (42) 5.55 (665) 0.54
Spain 0.51 (233) 3.90 (1785) 0.75 (126) 6.29 (1062) 0.20
Other European countries
Finland 2.25 (393) 3.93 (687) 1.50 (111) 3.97 (293) 1.60c
France 1.63 (788) 4.21 (2037) 2.09 (373) 6.16 (1100) 2.11
Germany 1.13 (155) 2.58 (355) 1.32 (71) 3.21 (173) 1.36
United Kingdom 3.33 (1192) 4.08 (1458) 3.17 (417) 4.28 (564) 2.28
Notes: a Percent of movers from ECHP and number of moves in parenthesis. b Gross outows as a
percentage of the population aged 15 to 64 years, OECD (2005). c Gross outows as a percentage of the
general population, OECD (2000).
43
Table 10. Inter- and intra-regional family migration. Random and xed e¤ects estimates
Random e¤ects Fixed e¤ects
Inter-regional Intra-regional Inter-regional Intra-regional
Husband employed 0.198 0.157 -0.248 0.344
[1.85] [2.87] [-0.72] [2.32]
Wife employed -0.096 -0.041 0.041 0.069
[-1.37] [-0.91] [0.21] [0.58]
Wife employed, children 0.015 0.090 0.244 0.237
[0.20] [1.78] [0.99] [1.61]
Wife employed, children, SEa -0.265 0.041 -1.872 -0.372
[-1.90] [0.76] [-2.69] [-2.08]
Children (presence) -0.085 -0.014 -0.123 0.036
[-2.99] [-0.85] [-0.85] [0.54]
Homeowners -0.522 -0.804 -1.084 -1.759
[-10.51] [-29.10] [-5.07] [-15.90]
Husbands age 0.717 -0.634
[2.17] [-3.85]
Husbands age squared -1.086 0.829
[-2.19] [3.37]
Husbandage
30-34 -0.039 -0.104
[-0.68] [-2.97]
35-39 -0.068 -0.228
[-1.10] [-6.12]
40-45 -0.288 -0.279
[-2.38] [-4.63]
Tertiary level (Husband) 0.259 0.128
[4.27] [3.44]
Upper secondary level (H) 0.090 0.033
[1.40] [0.98]
Tertiary level (Wife) 0.210 0.069
[3.49] [1.85]
Upper secondary level (W) 0.053 0.013
[0.83] [0.39]
Always same region (H) -0.082 -0.054
[-1.64] [-1.82]
Always same region (W) -0.210 -0.090
[-4.25] [-3.03]
Constant -1.93 -0.882
[-12.94] [-11.16]
Log-Likelihood -1775.70 -5716.73 -627.21 -2782.95
 0.071 0.051
[1.64] [1.84]
N 24314 27904 2007 9533
Notes: t-ratios in brackets. ,  and  denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
a SE denotes that the family live in a Southern European country. Random e¤ects estimates include
year and regional dummies and the mean of time-varying regressors. Fixed e¤ects estimates include year
dummies.
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Table 11. Family migration and previous migration experiencies. Random and xed
e¤ects estimates
Random e¤ects Fixed e¤ects
Inter-regional Intra-regional Inter-regional Intra-regional
Husband employed 0.195 0.159 -0.248 0.344
[1.82] [2.91] [-0.72] [2.31]
Wife employed -0.095 -0.042 0.043 0.074
[-1.36] [-0.94] [0.22] [0.62]
Wife employed, children -0.053 0.133 0.174 0.118
[-0.59] [2.32] [0.60] [0.69]
Wife employed, children, NMa 0.122 -0.085 -0.030 0.113
[1.26] [-1.35] [-0.08] [0.54]
Wife employed, children, NM and SEb -0.508 0.093 -2.254 -0.357
[-2.46] [1.51] [-1.99] [-1.61]
Children (presence) -0.084 -0.015 -0.122 0.036
[-2.94] [-0.92] [-0.84] [0.54]
Homeowners -0.517 -0.805 -1.087 -1.759
[-10.40] [-29.14] [-5.10] [-15.90]
Husbands age 0.710 -0.631
[2.15] [-3.83]
Husbands age squared -1.079 0.824
[-2.18] [3.35]
Husbands age
30-34 -0.039 -0.103
[-0.69] [-2.95]
35-39 -0.069 -0.227
[-1.11] [-6.10]
40-45 -0.293 -0.278
[-2.42] [-4.61]
Tertiary level (Husband) 0.259 0.128
[4.26] [3.44]
Upper secondary level (H) 0.085 0.036
[1.31] [1.06]
Tertiary level (Wife) 0.213 0.068
[3.53] [1.82]
Upper secondary level (W) 0.052 0.014
[0.81] [0.40]
Always same region (H) -0.084 -0.054
[-1.67] [-1.79]
Always same region (W) -0.228 -0.073
[-3.97] [-2.02]
Constant -1.921 -0.896
[-12.79] [-11.13]
Log-Likelihood 1773.66 -5715.63 -628.64 -2783.78
 0.080 0.048
[0.040] [1.151]
N 24314 27904 2007 9533
Notes: t-ratios in brackets. ,  and  denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
a NM denotes that the wife has never changed region of residence. b SE denotes that the family live in a
Southern European country. Random e¤ects estimates include year and regional dummies and the mean
of time-varying regressors. Fixed e¤ects estimates include year dummies.
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Table 12. Family migration, the husbands employment status and the presence of
children. Fixed e¤ects estimates
Inter-regional Intra-regional
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Wife employed 0.074 0.062 0.135 0.137
[0.47] [0.39] [1.55] [1.58]
Husband employed 0.035 0.005 0.327 0.325
[0.09] [0.01] [1.90] [1.89]
Husband employed, children -0.413 -0.294 0.295 0.260
[-1.43] [-0.87] [1.84] [1.46]
Husband employed, children, NMa -0.470 -0.044
[-1.14] [-0.19]
Husband employed, children, NM and SEb -0.110 0.949 -0.591 -0.615
[-0.21] [1.42] [-3.25] [-2.67]
Children (presence) 0.034 0.042 0.045 0.047
[0.23] [0.27] [0.62] [0.63]
Homeowners -1.070 -1.075 -1.765 -1.772
[-5.03] [-5.06] [-15.93] [-15.97]
Husbands age 0.731 0.712 -0.632 -0.629
[2.22] [2.16] [-3.83] [-3.81]
Husbands age squared -1.098 -1.067 0.827 0.824
[-2.21] [-2.15] [3.36] [3.35]
Log-Likelihood -630.50 -629.27 -2779.99 -2779.40
N 2007 2007 9533 9533
Notes: t-ratios in brackets. ,  and  denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
a NM denotes that the wife has never changed region of residence. b SE denotes that the family live in a
Southern European country. Random e¤ects estimates include year and regional dummies and the mean
of time-varying regressors. Fixed e¤ects estimates include year dummies.
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